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 Abstract 
 
This paper examines the stance of fiscal policy in Swaziland since the 1980s, and the 
attempts that have been made to restrain the excessive deficits that have built up over 
the past 15 years. Swaziland’s fiscal difficulties have arisen in part from two decades of 
slow growth, and falling revenue from SACU’s revenue sharing pool, aggravated by the 
collapse of the fiscal discipline. It would be easier to reduce fiscal deficit and stabilise 
debt burdens if growth were to pick up and the tax system restructured. But growth 
alone or expanding the revenue sources per se won’t resolve the problems. Bold actions 
to rationalize government expenditures and strengthen mechanism for public debt man-
agement are essential for the needed adjustment. The fiscal adjustment road map, if 
firmly implemented, could bring the deficit down to a sustainable level and reduce de-
pendence on SACU transfers, and government debt would remain sustainable over the 
medium term. However, policy inaction would be a sure recipe for deeper crisis as the 
overall fiscal balance would remain above 14.5 percent over the medium term and debt 
to GDP ratio would rise to unsustainable levels (over the medium term).  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
 
Since Swaziland's economic bubble burst at the beginning of the 1990s, growth remains 
dismally low, and the last twenty years can be described as "the lost decades" for the 
Swazi economy. From 1999 to 2009, economic growth averaged 2.3 percent per annum. 
Between 2008–2012, growth deteriorated to a level not seen since 1980s: at 0.2 percent in 
2009, 1.3 percent in 2011 and 0.8 percent in 2012, far short of the growth necessary for 
tackling the problem of unemployment, poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Ayoki, 
2011). Moving forward, government is faced with a delicate choice between the need to 
limit future spending increases so as to bring the fiscal deficit under control, and to ensure 
a return to robust economic growth through structural increase in public spending. Bal-
ancing these goals is a difficult choice that is complicated by the declining domestic reve-
nues.   
Given this elevated level of fiscal deficit, what will happen to public debt if there is no 
adjustment to the primary balance in the medium term? What kind of fiscal adjustment 
will be required in order to reduce or stablish the public debt stock? This paper endeav-
ours to address these questions using more recently available data from IMF Article IV 
Staff Reports and the joint World Bank–IMF Debt Sustainbility Analysis and other gov-
ernment sources (the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Swaziland).  
An increase in the structural budget deficit beyond current level of 14 percent of GDP 
(as at 31 March, 2011), which one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa—would see the 
burden of government debt and interest payments increase to unsustainable levels. If left 
unaddressed for too long, persistently sluggish growth will result in contracting revenue 
base, an expansion of fiscal deficit, worsening poverty and unemployment. To this end, 
the Government of Swaziland launched in 2010, a‘Fiscal Adjustment Roadmap’ in which 
general government expenditure is expected to be reduced by more than 10 percent of 
GDP – from 53.2 percent to 34.7 percent of GDP – over a six-year period: 2011–2016. It 
is hoped that this will bring down fiscal deficit to 10 percent of GDP in 2011/12 and less 
than 3 percent in 2014/15. One-third of the adjustment is expected to come through in-
creases in revenues, with the remainder coming through real-terms spending cuts, mostly 
the wage bill, which is the single largest public expenditure item.  
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According to the adjustment roadmap, the economy could see up to E 2.4 billion (ac-
cumulated 8 percentage point of GDP) in spending cuts in the next four years (2013/14 – 
2016/17). This will be augmented by the privatization and divestiture of state enterprises 
and assets that began with Swazi Bank; raising revenue through the new Swaziland Rev-
enue Authority, increase in tax rates on a number of goods and services, to bring them in 
line with those in South Africa, and to broaden the tax base by bringing into the taxnet, 
items such as air time and electricity.  
The impact of all these measures on the economy is not very clear. Whereas the im-
portance of fiscal adjustment in bringing about the stability of fiscal system is not in 
doubt, further fiscal contraction in an already fragile macroeconomic and growth envi-
ronment can fuel further instability and perhaps new economic downturn. The decade of 
persistently sluggish growth has resulted in an expansion of poverty and unemployment, 
which together with the high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS (32.4 percent) continues to 
exert considerable pressure on government resources (Ayoki, 2011). Unfortunately, exist-
ing literature says very little about potential effects of fiscal adjustment for countries in 
similar situation as Swaziland. We have not come across studies that provide evidence on 
effect of fiscal policies in restraining fiscal deficits in Swaziland or else where in Sub–
Saharan Africa—from which we could draw policy lessons. For instance, what is the op-
timal mix of the austerity versus non-austerity measures in restraining fiscal deficits? 
What lessons do the outcomes have for policy makers in Swaziland and elsewhere?   
A rough estimate by IMF suggests that “a budget cut equal to 1 percent of GDP reduc-
es domestic demand by about 1percent and raises the unemployment rate by 0.3 percent-
age point.”1 As for the case of Swaziland, the IMF staff estimate suggests that fiscal ad-
justment would dampen the real GDP growth to -1.9 percent in 2011, with about 8 per-
cent rise in consumer price inflation (from 6.25 percent in 2010). These changes reflect 
higher domestic taxes and levies on various products, and increase of food and fuel prices 
on international markets. The only positive impact is on current account to GDP ratio, 
which would improve to 12.3 percent. 
This paper analyses the reform initiatives and the implications of some specific policy 
commitments/goals. In what follows, Section 2 provides an overview of fiscal develop-
ment in Swaziland, exploring the link between the fiscal crisis in Swaziland and the two 
areas of tolerance: the collapse of the fiscal discipline and external dependency (i.e. over 
                                                   
1 World Economic Outlook, October 2010, Chapter 3, “Will It Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal 
Consolidation,” p. 113.  
3 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
reliance on SACU revenue and primary commodity exports). Section 3 provides detailed 
accounts of total public spending in Swaziland. It explores the first area of tolerance: the 
collapse of fiscal discipline, within the overall context of public expenditure, and tries to pro-
vide clues into Government’s priorities and commitment to key sectors vis-à-vis other sectors 
over the years. Having explained the measures introduced to improve fiscal sustainability, 
this section goes further to document the challenges facing their realization and effective 
implementation ranging from political constraint to other issues. In Section 4, the evolu-
tion and levels of government debt is explained and compared with it comparators in the 
region, and various benchmarks used internationally. It examines the circumstances giv-
ing rise to each of those debts and to make fine judgments about the extent, if any, of a 
political interest or negligence. Chapter 5 focuses on fiscal adjustment strategies and Sec-
tion 6 concludes with a set of challenges facing fiscal adjustment, both short- and long-
term. 
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2 An overview of the fiscal developments in 
Swaziland   
 
 
 
This section unveils the drivers behind the fiscal developments in Swaziland as the result 
of two areas of tolerance: the collapse of the fiscal discipline and and external dependen-
cy (over reliance on SACU revenue and primary commodity exports). It highlights the 
challenges ahead (arising from recent financial and global economic crisis) and areas that 
require special attention from policymakers. Swaziland, whose economy is closely linked 
to that of South Africa and exported primary commodities, suffered from declining export 
prices, which impacted negatively on output. 
 
2.1 Swaziland’s external trade and revenue trend 
2.1.1 Swaziland’s foreign trade 
 
Historically, Swaziland has relied heavily on import revenues and its trade ties with 
South Africa—its main trading partner—who accounts for 70 percent of all Swaziland’s 
exports, and about 90 percent of her imports. Swaziland enjoys well-developed road links 
with South Africa. It also has railroads running east to west and north to south. The older 
east-west link, called the Goba line, makes it possible to export bulk goods from Swazi-
land through the Port of Maputo in Mozambique. Before the political conflict in Mozam-
bique, most of Swaziland's imports used to be shipped through this port. Conflict in 
Mozambique in the 1980s diverted many Swazi exports to ports in South Africa. Swazi-
land mainly uses the port today for exports of sugar, citrus, and forest products, with fu-
ture usage of the port expected to increase. A north-south rail link, completed in 1986, 
provides a connection between the Eastern Transvaal rail network and the South African 
ports of Richard's Bay and Durban.  
Swaziland’s second trading partner (second to South Africa) is the European Union 
that account for about 15 percent of her exports and the United States (14 percent of total 
exports). Swaziland exports citrus fruits, sugar and beef to the European Union, wood 
pulp to Japan, and textiles to the United States.  Manufacturing sector accounts for 
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42.3percent of GDP, and agriculture that accounts for 7 percent of GDP and 70 percent of 
total employment is strongly linked to the manufacturing sector. Sugar is Swaziland's 
leading export earner and private-sector employer. Other important export earners are soft 
drink concentrate, wood pulp and lumber from cultivated pine forests, pineapple and cit-
rus fruit. Swaziland also mines coal and diamonds for export. In 2005, mining contributed 
about 0.6 percent of Swaziland's GDP. The services sector is dominated by finance and 
banking, and transport industry – and it contributed about 38 percent of GDP in 2008. 
Tourism contributes about 7 percent of GDP – earned from over 424,000 visitors that the 
country hosts annually, mostly from Europe and South Africa. 
Beginning in mid-1985, the depreciated value of the domestic currency helped to in-
crease the competitiveness of Swazi exports and moderated the growth of imports, gener-
ating trade surpluses. From the mid–1990s, the country started to ran into small trade defi-
cits, partly due to appreciation of the lilangeni. The situation deteriorated when the financial 
and economic crisis hit, in September 2008.  
The economic and financial crisis that has unfolded over the past few years has caused 
a dramatic deterioration in Swaziland’s external trade, with implications for growth and 
government finances. Tax revenues declined by 10 percentage point of GDP, from 29 
percent of GDP in 2009 to 19 percent of GDP in 2010 due to deteriorating trade receipts 
(SACU revenue). As a result, fiscal deficit reached 14 percent of GDP in 2010 pushing up 
public sector borrowing to 60.7 percent of GDP in 2011.2  
The experience of the twentieth century has shown that countries with economies de-
pendent on revenues from a few primary commodity exports and foreign inflows are like-
ly to suffer big swings of income through causes over which they frequently have little or 
no control. Swaziland is no exception to this. Fiscal policies in the importing countries 
especially when caused by events such as the recent debt crisis in Europe will affect de-
mand in importing countries and revenues of the trading partners; and special trade 
agreements may improve the position of some suppliers vis-a-vis the rest.   
2.1.2 SACU receipts and Swaziland fiscal balance 
 
For several years, increased SACU revenue helped the Swaziland Government to realise 
large fiscal surpluses and accumulate substantial international reserves (receipts from 
                                                   
2 Swaziland’s economy grew by 2.4% in 2008 before declining to an estimated 0.2% in 2009. Projec-
tions for 2010 and 2011 are that growth will rebound to 2.2% and 2.4%, respectively, below the 5% 
government target to reduce poverty to 30% by 2015.  
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SACU account for over 60 percent of government operating revenue). Between 2005 and 
2007, SACU receipts (accrued to Swaziland) increased by 6 percentage points of GDP, 
from 18.1 percent of GDP in 2005/06, to 24 percent in 2008/09, with a peak in 2006/07 
(28 percent of GDP) - translating into a huge surplus of E1.957 billion in 2006/07 (9 per-
cent of GDP) and E612.9 million in 2007/08. This was driven by South Africa’s growing 
economy and the rise in international trade, resulting into increased SACU customs reve-
nue pool.3 In 2009/2010, SACU revenue fell by about two-thirds (11 percent of GDP) as 
a result of the global economic crisis and the country slipped into deficits (Figure 2). 
  
Figure 1. Fiscal balances and SACU revenue (Percent of GDP) 
 
 
In FY 2010/11, SACU imports fell sharply due to the contraction of economic activity 
in South Africa and the unwinding of infrastructure spending after the 2010 World Cup. 
Consequently, the transfers from the common revenue pool to Swaziland fell by 11 per-
centage point of GDP in FY 2010/11. The shortfall in SACU revenue and a high wage 
bill fueled a fiscal crisis. While other countries have reduced their reliance on internation-
al trade taxes during the last two decades and increased their reliance on direct and indi-
rect domestic taxes, Swaziland has not made much progress in increasing her reliance on 
other taxes as a source of fiscal revenues, making her vulnerable to external shock.  
                                                   
3 The new SACU revenue sharing formula came into force in 2005/06. The new formula was meant to 
facilitate equitable and transparent sharing of SACU revenues amongst the member states, and to facili-
tate efficient fiscal planning. 
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Unless robust corrective measures are implemented, and if the decline in SACU reve-
nue continues, the deficit could deteriorate to 10 percent of GDP in 2011/12 given a fur-
ther wage increase granted in mid-2010.  
2.1.3 External shocks and Swazi manufactures exports 
    
Change in preferential trade regime of the EU excebrated the situation. The year 2007 
marked the end of the EU preferential treatment for Swaziland’s main sugar and textile 
exports. From the same year (2007) that the European Community began to remove sub-
sidies on sugar, Swaziland’s exports of raw and processed sugar declined steadily in val-
ue. With prices set by the Sugar Protocol and the EU, the 60 percent rise in world sugar 
prices in 2009 (came on the heel of a failed sugar crop in Brazil) did not have significant 
impact on the sector’s performance. Appreciation of lilangeni eroded the benefits from 
increased sugar export receipts.  
Being unable to respond to the external shocks and current account deficits by devalu-
ing its currency as its currency is pegged to the South Africa Rand, Swaziland’s output 
contracted by 2.4 percentage point of GDP as a result, that year (2009). Swaziland faced 
reduction in export volumes for most of its manufacturing products (cement, agricultural 
machinery, electronic equipment, refrigerator production, footwear, gloves, office equip-
ment, confectionery, furniture, glass and bricks) as a result of the slowdown in global 
demand. The manufacturing sector contracted by 1.6 percent in 2008 and 2 percent in 
2009, and 0.7 percent in 2010 before showing a slight recovery of 1.5 percent in 2011. 
The most affected sub-sector was wood and wood products4.  
The effect continues to be felt in employment front as companies retain cost cutting 
measures such as scaled down production. For example, Usutu Pulp used to be the lead-
ing wood pulp processing company and Swaziland’s largest employer, with a capacity to 
produce 220,000 metric tons of bleached kraft pulp every year. In January 2010, Sappi, 
the London-based management of Usutu Pulp, decided to wind up operation in Swazi-
land, a move that led to a loss of 550 jobs. Some companies restructured their operations, 
others closed shop entirely. Swazi Paper Mills, closed with a loss of 223 jobs, while Peak 
Timbers retrenched half of its 170-workforce at its Piggs Peak plantation. Further job 
losses are likely to occur as the effects of the Usutu Pulp closure cascade through the 
economy. Most of the 250 or so local firms that supplied the mill may also be forced to 
close. Others will continue to make losses. In 2009 alone, the Swaziland Electricity Com-
                                                   
4 The wood-pulp industry was also further impacted by forest fires that destroyed timber supplies. 
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pany incurred financial loss of SZL 15.6 million. The Swaziland Railway and other firms 
providing road transport services might have incurred similar loss of SZL 7 million and 
SZL 6 million, respectively.  
The construction sector contracted by 3 percent in 2009 and 10 percent in 2011, while 
the textile and apparel sector shed an estimated 3 000 jobs in 2009 due to falling global 
demand and production cuts. Swaziland's textile and apparel sector thrived on preferential 
trade arrangement with the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) initiative for which Swaziland became eligible in 2000. Swaziland qualified for 
the apparel provision in 2001 through which over 30 000 jobs, mostly for women, were 
created in the textiles and apparel sub-sector. This was significant for an industry emerg-
ing from the setbacks created by increased global competition when the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) came to an end on 1 January, 2005.  
Appreciation of the South African Rand (Lilangeni is pegged to the South African 
rand) also worked against exports. In the wake of the global financial crisis, employment 
in the textile and apparel sector fell from 15,000 in 2008 to 12,000 by mid-2009. More 
jobs would have been lost had it not been for the Lilangeni’s depreciation, which kept 
exports going.  
The current account deficit rose to 5.4 percent of GDP in 2010 and 7.4 percent in 2011 
– the cause being, the drop in SACU receipts and reduced exports volumes arising from 
fall in export demand in 2010 and 2011. More significantly, customs receipts – the gov-
ernment’s primary revenue source – declined, following a fall in Southern African Cus-
toms Union (SACU) trade.  
Moreover, ever rising recurrent spending and high public wage bill, estimated at 18 
percent of GDP and about 52 percent of the overall budget (far above the conventional 
benchmark of 35 percent) is a major source of worry for the country’s fiscal sustainabil-
ity. However, the analysis also called attention to, among other issues, the loss of jobs and 
other adjustment costs that would be faced by Swaziland. How much impact shall be 
faced by the economy is a matter generating a lot of debate a cross section of the public.  
In 2010, SACU receipts fell by 60 percent, promoting Cabinet to approve a Fiscal Ad-
justment Roadmap targeting a deficit of less than 3 percent of GDP in 2014/15. 
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2.2 Medium–term fiscal challenges 
 
The main instrument of fiscal policy in Swaziland is the central government spending 
on essential public goods and services such as healthcare, education and infrastructure 
investment. Government intends to deliver these essential public goods and services, in an 
efficient manner and to facilitate high rates of economic growth and employment, and 
reduce poverty. Tax rates have not been used as a fiscal policy instrument in most cases, 
either in expansionary or in contractionary situations. 
2.2.1 Overall budgetary situation  
 
Table 1 summarises government fiscal operations – the public spendings and how they 
are financed. During the 1990s, the country often ran small budget deficits. Government 
spending as a share of GDP was broadly stable from 1993 to 1999 at around 30 percent. 
Government spending rose to 35 percent of GDP in 2004/05 and remained at that level 
until 2007, then increased dramatically to 40.6 percent in 2008/09 and 43.3 percent in 
2009/10 due to salary rise, before returning to 34.5 percent in 2010/11 as fiscal adjust-
ment measures began to take effect. Overall, government spending expanded by a 10.2 
percentage points of GDP between 2003/04 to 2009/10 (from 30.4 percent of GDP in 
2003/04 to 40.6 percent in 2009/10 before calming down to 34.5 percent in 2010/11).     
In contrast, government revenue contracted by a 6.4 percentage points of GDP, from 
26.6 percent of GDP in 2003/2004, to 20.2 percent in 2011/12. The primary deficit grew 
from E434 million (2.9 percent of GDP) in 2003/2004 to E3.647 billion (14.3 percent of 
GDP) in 2010/11, while Government debt increased from 12.1 percent of GDP in 
2009/10 to 14.8 percent in 2010/11 (Figure 2). The fiscal deficit was financed by drawing 
down government deposits at the central bank, in addition to domestic borrowing (securi-
ties, treasury bills and bonds), and an accumulation of domestic payment arrears of E 1.3 
billion. The external current account deficit deteriorated to 18.5 percent of GDP in 2010. 
Consequently, the gross official reserves of the Central Bank of Swaziland continue to 
decline and stood at about E 4 billion (equivalent to 2.6 months of import cover) on April 
29, 2011. 
The fiscal deterioration is partly driven by fall in tax revenues (Figures 2 and 3). Tax 
revenue accounts for over 90 percent of the government operating revenue every year. 
This has been the trend for the last one decade or so. Other revenues are mobilised 
through fees and charges as well as grants.   
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Table 1 Swaziland: Government fiscal operations, 2003/04 – 2010/11 
  
 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Revenue and grant 3,890.7 4,842.3 5,499.1 8,020.4 8,085.5 9,409.9 9,145.7 6,584.1 
     Revenue 3,763.9 4,726.7 5,326.8 7,854.8 7,898.3 9,264.9 8,899.0 6,084.7 
     Grant from abroad 126.9 115.6 172.2 165.6 187.3 145.0 246.7 499.4 
Total expenditure & net lending 4,324.7 5,557.4 5,828.9 6,062.7 7,472.6 9,780.3 10,427.8 10,231.4 
     Current expenditure 3,457.7 4,295.8 4,416.3 4,681.3 5,522.2 7,308.2 7,957.5 7,683.5 
     Capital expenditure 867.1 1,258.7 1,409.7 1,436.6 1,950.4 2,472.1 2,470.3 2,547.8 
     Net lending (0.1) 2.9 2.9 (55.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Overall surplus(deficit) (434.0) (715.0) (329.9) 1,957.7 612.9 (370.4) (1282.1) (3647.3) 
Financing 434.0 715.0 329.9 (1957.7) (612.9) 370.4 1282.1 3647.3 
Foreign 75.2 220.0 211.5 140.2 413.1 (154.1 12.6 357.5 
   Gross Borrowing 182.8 349.1 383.1 323.4 257.8 236.5 289.4 712.5 
   Amortization (107.5) (129.1) (171.6) (183.2) 155.3 (390.7) (276.8) (355.0) 
Domestic 358.8 495.1 118.4 (2097.9) (1026.0) 524.6 1,269.5 3,289.8 
Capital Invest. Facility 
           Monetary Authorities (179.5) (59.3) (705.4) (1026.7) (1768.6) (1823.4) -- --
  Banks 115.0 36.7 (85.8) 48.4 (123.9) (272.2) -- -- 
  Other 423.3 517.7 909.6 (1119.7) 866.5 2,620.1 -- -- 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Note: 2009/10 estimated outturn, 2010/11Budget 
-- not available 
Figure 2. Fiscal developments 
 
In 2010/11 financial year, total tax revenue collected amounted to E 5,574.4 million, rep-
resenting 72 percent of Swaziland government’s operating revenue and about 40 percent 
of her Gross Domestic Product. Indeed, the tax effort, as measured by the ratio of tax rev-
enue to GDP (at over 44% for the past decades) are far above average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Figure 3). Swaziland relies on international trade taxes (import duties and excise/ 
sales tax on imports), which account for over 70 percent of total government revenue. 
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 Figure 3. Swaziland’s tax effort  
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Over 80 percent of the import revenue comes from SACU Customs Union receipts. Over-
all, SACU revenue account for about 60 percent of total government revenue.  
Figure 4. Government spending, revenue, and budget balance 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
   
2.2.2 Fiscal sustainbility  
 
Central Government debt is expected to increase from 15 percent of GDP at end 
2011/12 to 20 percent by end of 2016. The country’s escalating budget deficit of 14.3 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for fiscal year 2010/11 that ended March 31, 
2011 and deteriorating debt following a fall in SACU revenue has tested the resilience of 
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Swaziland's fiscal policy. With the reduction in government revenue, and a continuation 
of current spending, it will be difficult to finance growing deficit (above 10 percent of 
GDP in 2016) from the domestic resources without resorting to domestic borrowing and 
stockpiling debt —compromising private sector growth. 
Real GDP growth in 2010 was about 2 percent, while inflation was at 4.5 percent. Real 
GDP per capita contracted by 2.4 percent in the year to March 2009 and grew at 0.1 per-
cent in the year to March 2010. Consumption has increased steadily over the years and is 
above 85 percent of GDP. Domestic savings remains low and the country can barely sus-
tain a deficit without breaching reserve requirements. Investment has been on declining 
trend (in real terms from 20.1 percent of GDP in 2002 to 11.4 percent in 2008 and 
10.6 percent in 2009).  
The budget deficit, estimated at about 14.3 percent of GDP (in 2011) is one of the 
highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The large fiscal deficit, which is always financed by do-
mestic borrowing, government deposits at the central bank, and an accumulation of do-
mestic payment arrears amounting to over E 1 billion, annually, is holding the economy 
hostage and stands on the way of building a vibrant private sector. It is also largely re-
sponsible for the growing public debt now standing at about 50 percent of GDP. Although 
some relief has been provided through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initia-
tive, the requirements of debt servicing continue to direct investment away from essential 
social programmes.     
Recent experiences with sovereign debt crisis in Europe has reawakened the world to 
the reality of how fiscal insolvency can destabilise an economy and put at risk the devel-
opment of a country. Following on from Greece in 2010, to Ireland and Portugal in late-
2010 and early-2011, and to Spain and Italy, the domino contagion in Europe continued 
with significant impact on growth of its economies.5 Greece, Ireland, and Portugal all had 
to adopt fiscal austerity measures, in exchange for financial assistance from the IMF. 
Greece’s budget deficit (primary deficit)—excluding interest payments, thus reflecting 
the underlying fiscal policy stance—stood at 10.1 percent of GDP in 2009.  
In October 2009, the newly elected government announced that the Greek deficit sta-
tistics had been underreported. The actual size of the budget deficits was much larger than 
previously thought. High levels of public debt at 126.8 percent of GDP in 2009 and 142 
percent in 2010 twiggered a market response that caused the interest rate on Greek bonds 
                                                   
5 Ireland’s fiscal situation became serious when the Irish government decided to rescue their failing 
banking system, so the origin of Irish crisis was different from that in Greece.  
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to rise considerably. This was the beginning of the protracted Euro zone sovereign debt 
crisis.  Greece was forced into fiscal adjustment by the market being unwilling to contin-
ue to finance a string of deficits. The first rescue package of May 2010 turned out to be 
insufficient leading to a second rescue package in May 2011, which included a require-
ment that public debt be reduced to prudent levels. Tough austerity measures and tax in-
creases led to incredible suffering in amongst the Greek population. 
In the case of Swaziland, reducing Government expenditure and over-dependence on 
SACU receipts through increased collections from direct taxes on income and profits, and 
indirect taxes on goods and services still remains a crucial strategy for the country going 
forward. In the IMF’s baseline scenario, this kind of fiscal crisis leads to significant 
spending cuts. If left unaddressed for too long, an increase in the structural budget deficit 
of this size would see the burden of government debt and interest payments increase to 
unsustainable levels.  
In response, Government has embarked on a fiscal adjustment measures that intend to 
align the fiscal deficit with available financing. Government is pursuing some form of 
austerity, aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit, restoring economic growth, creating more 
jobs, improving the quality and efficiency of public spending and to effectively tackle 
corruption, but actual implementation has been slow.  
During the 2003 Asia crisis, Indonesia enacted the State Financial Law and Govern-
ment Regulation no. 23/2003 which imposes a limit on fiscal spending. Are we likely to 
see the same framework for ensuring fiscal sustainability in Swaziland? The Indonesia 
numerical ceilings of 3 percent of GDP for the fiscal deficit and 60 percent of GDP for 
public debt were replicated from the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union. Perhaps it 
would pay off to introduce a similar law that imposes fiscal discipline in Swaziland. In 
any case, the government will need to strengthen public resource management engaging 
in consolidated efforts to improve the quality of spending and to direct resources to criti-
cal social services, including investment in human capital and infrastructure development 
order to foster economic growth.  
2.3 Does public spending follow economic cycle? 
 
During the booms of the late 1980s, the ratio of total expenditure to national income 
fell. During years of low economic growth of the late-1990s and during the global finan-
cial cris (2008 – 2009), total public expenditure rose as a share of national income (Figure 
5). However, the increase in total expenditure as a share of national income between 2005 
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and 2007 occurred during relatively strong economic conditions. This increase reflects a 
structural increase in public spending, which does not reflect economic cycles. 
Figure 5. Economic growth and changes in government expenditure 
 
To ensure a return to robust and sustainable economic growth; able to tackle the prob-
lem of unemployment and poverty, the policy focus should be on revenue mobilization 
(especially increasing the country’s reliance on direct taxes on income and profits and 
indirect taxes on goods and services) while encouraging a continued recovery in external 
trade, as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, including increases in remit-
tances from the Swazis living abroad.  
However, the structure of the economy and poverty level impose a challenge to reve-
nue mobilisation. By most social indicators, Swaziland remains one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Over 60 percent of the population lives in poverty, and close to 
70 percent of the youth population is unemployed. An estimated 25 percent of the 
adult population is living with HIV, and the average life expectancy at birth is by far, 
the lowest in the world. Moreover, one-quarter of children who enroll in primary 
school drop out of school before the end of Grade 7. Over 70 percent of Swazis live in 
rural areas and are engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the question of land use and 
ownership remains a very sensitive one. Most of the high-level economic activity is in the 
hands of non-Africans. Nearly 60 percent of Swazi territory is held by the Crown in trust 
of the Swazi nation. The remaining 40 percent is privately owned, much of it by foreign-
ers.  
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3 Public expenditure 
 
 
This chapter follows on from the previous discussion, which argues that the fiscal crisis in 
Swaziland is a result of two areas of tolerance: the collapse of the fiscal discipline and ex-
ternal dependency (i.e. over reliance on SACU revenue and primary commodity exports).  
This chapter explores the first area of tolerance: the collapse of fiscal discipline within the 
overall context of public expenditure, and provides clues into Government’s priorities and 
commitment to key sectors vis-à-vis other sectors over the years. Public expenditure is ana-
lysed at two levels: at aggregate macro level, and inter-sector level, and in some cases, main-
taining a distinction between recurrent and capital expenditure. Trends in expenditure are 
examined along side government revenue. The recurrent budgets are examined and the 
proportion of recurrent budget going to different sectors are analysed. 
   
3.1 Aggregate level of government spending 
Figure 6 shows the trend in aggregate level of government spending – total expenditures 
by the entire public sector – the central government, local governments, local authorities, 
autonomous institutions and public corporations – in value terms and as a share of nation-
al income since 1999–2000. 
Figure 6. Trend in government expenditure, 199/200 – 2010/11 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
As Figure 6 shows, total public expenditure has grown relatively steadily in real terms, 
from E2.77billion (32 percent of GDP) in 1999/2000 to E10.4 billion (43.3 percent of 
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GDP) in 2010/11–- which translates into about E8,350 for every person in Swaziland. 
Between 1999/2000 and 2010/11, the average annual real increase in total expenditure 
has been 13 per cent (peaking at 30 percent in 2009/10), ten-times faster than the national 
income––driven primarily by spending on wages and salaries and debt interest payments. 
By 2013, public expenditure is expected to stablise at about 30 per cent of GDP and re-
mains at this level over the medium term when the economy returns to normal growth––
assuming a recovery of exports and commodity prices.  
 
3.2 Composition of public expenditure 
Government expenditure is divided into recurrent and capital expenditure (Table 2), con-
trolled by the Treasury Department of the Ministry of Finance. Government expenditure, 
including external development budget averaged 33.3 percent of GDP over the 1992/93–
2010/11 period, while total revenue including grants averaged 31.7 percent of GDP dur-
ing the same period.  
Table 2. Government expenditure (recurrent and capital), 2003/4 – 2010/11  
  2003/04 2004/05  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09 2009/10 2010/11  
 
(E’Million) 
   
 
 Statutory expenditure*   
 
          318,607 
Recurrent expenditure 3,457.7 4,295.8  4,416.3  4,681.3  5,522.2  7,308.2 8,465.1  8,146,487 
Capital expenditure 867.1 1,258.7  1,409.7  1,436.6  1,950.4  2,472.1 2,470.3  2,470,263 
Total expenditure 4,324.8 5554.5  5826  6117.9  7,472.6  9,780.33 10,935.40  10,935,357 
Total revenue & grants 3,890.7 4,842.3  5,499.1  8,020.4  8,085.5  9,409.9 9,642.0  6,944,930 
Overall surplus/ (deficit) (434.0) (715.0)   (329.9)  1,957.7  612.9  (370.4) (1,293.3)  (3,990,427) 
Financing 434.0 715.0 329.9 (1,957.7) (612.9) 370.4 1,293.3 3,990,427 
Foreign   
 
211.5  140.2  413.1  (154.2) (58.2) (54.3) 
  Gross borrowing  
 
383.1  323.4  257.8  236.5  289.4  289.4  
  Amortisation  
 
(171.6) (183.2) 155.3  (390.7) (347.6) (343.8) 
Domestic  
 
118.4  (2,097.9) (1,026.0) 524.6  1,351.5  4,044.8  
 
as share of GDP (PERCENT) 
   
 
 
Overall balance   -3.5 -5.3 -2.5 9.3 6.1 -0.8 -7.6 -9.5 
Financing 2.9 4.6 1.5 -10.5 -6.4 0.2 7.1 10.3 
  Foreign 0.5 1.6 1.2 -5.8 -3.6 -0.4 5.6 2.0 
  Domestic 2.3 2.9 0.3 -4.7 -6.9 0.6 1.5 8.3 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Note: *Exclusing redemption of foreign loan, /2 excluding grants. The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31 
  
Recurrent expenditure accounted for 69 percent of total expenditure in 2009/10 fiscal year 
(capital expenditure accounted for 27 percent and statutory expenditure for 4 percent). 
Table 2 shows how the expenditures are financed. Discretionary resources available to 
Government include domestic revenue and external assistance, minus debt service pay-
ment. However, volatility has characterised both domestic revenues and donor support 
(grants), thus complicating management of the budget. The budget deficit (excluding 
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grants) rose from 3.6 percent of GDP in 1992/93 to 14.3 percent of GDP in 2010/11 (Ta-
ble 2), financed through foreign aid inflows and domestic borrowing, and by drawing 
down on the reserves. Foreign inflows as percentage of GDP ranged between 2–6 percent. 
One challenge arising from this is the increase in the stock of external debt, which as a 
percentage of GDP, stood at 19.5 percent in 2002/03 before receeding to 9 percent in 
2011/12.  
3.2.1 Inter-sectoral expenditure allocations 
 Table 3 breaks down the real expenditure into various functional components—the pro-
portion of the government spending going to different sectors of the economy.   
Table 3. Sectoral composition of public expenditure 
  2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 
 
(in million emalangeni) 
     
General public service 2,049.80 2,471.80 2,674.60 2,964.00 3,199.40 4,026.00 4,814.90 4,399.20 
  General administration  1,419.30 1,627.70 1,918.40 2,138.10 2,330.30 2,900.50 3,049.80 2,733.40 
  Public order, safety &  
   defence  630.5 844.1 756.2 825.9 869.1 1125.3 1765.1 1665.8 
Social services 1,230.90 1,858.30 1,920.40 1,868.50 2,393.60 2,869.00 3,166.20 3,979.60 
  Education  751 1119.2 1174.1 1176.4 1556.2 1836.4 1732.8 2050.1 
  Health 367 441.9 422.8 413.8 596.5 812.1 922.1 1282.7 
  Other community &  
   social services 112.9 297.1 323.4 278.3 240.9 220.6 511.4 646.8 
Economic services 875.2 1009.6 977.3 1121.7 1696.1 2619.9 2716.2 2313.3 
  Agriculture  221.4 244.3 247.9 265 423.4 849.4 825.1 536 
  Industry & mining  67.6 79.9 90.5 81.5 46 341.3 384.3 373 
  Transport & communi- 
  cations 476.4 588.7 485.5 537.4 979.8 1088.9 1264.6 1072.5 
  Other 109.6 96.7 153.4 237.9 247 340.3 242.2 331.9 
Public debt interest 168.9 214.8 253.8 163.8 183.6 265.5 238.2 243.4 
Total 4,324.8 5,554.5 5,826.0 6,117.9 7,472.6 9,780.3 10,935.4 10,935.4 
 
( as a share of total govt expenditure, %) 
   
General public service 47.40 44.50 45.91 48.45 42.82 41.16 44.03 40.23 
  General administration  32.82 29.30 32.93 34.95 31.18 29.66 27.89 25.00 
  Public order, safety & 
  defence  14.58 15.20 12.98 13.50 11.63 11.51 16.14 15.23 
Social services 28.46 33.46 32.96 30.54 32.03 29.33 28.95 36.39 
  Education  17.36 20.15 20.15 19.23 20.83 18.78 15.85 18.75 
  Health 8.49 7.96 7.26 6.76 7.98 8.30 8.43 11.73 
  Other community & social 
  Services 2.61 5.35 5.55 4.55 3.22 2.26 4.68 5.91 
Economic services 20.24 18.18 16.77 18.33 22.70 26.79 24.84 21.15 
  Agriculture  5.12 4.40 4.26 4.33 5.67 8.68 7.55 4.90 
  Industry & mining  1.56 1.44 1.55 1.33 0.62 3.49 3.51 3.41 
  Transport & communica-  11.02 10.60 8.33 8.78 13.11 11.13 11.56 9.81 
  Other 2.53 1.74 2.63 3.89 3.31 3.48 2.21 3.04 
Public debt interest 3.91 3.87 4.36 2.68 2.46 2.71 2.18 2.23 
Source: Ministry of Finance and IMF 
 
The Government’s strategy, “Ingcamu” (adopted in 2008/09) and the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy and Action Plan (the PRSAP) prioritises public action across various sectors to 
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meet the objective of poverty eradication and identifies key sectors that are given priority 
in resource allocation—priority ares are: basic health care and education, which have re-
ceived, on average, 19 percent and 8.4 percent of the government budgetary resources 
annually over the last eight years. These are also the sectors that are protected from budg-
et cuts. Other priority areas include agriculture and roads maintenance. However, public 
administration remains by far the biggest spenders of public resources.  
Generally, the increases in government expenditure have not been directed towards 
growth enhancing/stimulating activities, but more towards consumption as revealed by 
the share of resources going to public administration vis-a-vis education and economic 
services. Public administration—particularly spending on wage bills continues to be an 
obstacle—crowding-out spending in other priority programme areas such as infrastructure 
investment. The Minister of Finance admitted this in the 2004 budget speech that, the 
public spending steered public consumption by approximately 40 percent in nominal 
terms at the expense of capital formation. He repeated this concern in subsequent budget 
speeches. Table 4 shows the growth in public expenditure by functional areas, which 
shows slow growth of resources to eduction relative to other sectors.   
Table 4. Growth in public expenditure by sector (PERCENT) 
  2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 
2003–2011 
average 
General public service 42.25 20.59 8.20 10.82 7.94 25.84 19.60 -8.63 15.8 
  General administration  64.58 14.68 17.86 11.45 8.99 24.47 5.15 -10.37 17.1 
  Public order, safety & defence  8.97 33.88 -10.41 9.22 5.23 29.48 56.86 -5.63 15.9 
Social services -0.92 50.97 3.34 -2.70 28.10 19.86 10.36 25.69 16.8 
  Education  -8.24 49.03 4.91 0.20 32.28 18.01 -5.64 18.31 13.6 
  Health 64.72 20.41 -4.32 -2.13 44.15 36.14 13.55 39.11 26.5 
  Other community & social services -43.83 163.15 8.85 -13.95 -13.44 -8.43 131.82 26.48 31.3 
Economic services 2.33 15.36 -3.20 14.78 51.21 54.47 3.68 -14.83 15.5 
  Agriculture  45.28 10.34 1.47 6.90 59.77 100.61 -2.86 -35.04 23.3 
  Industry & mining  30.75 18.20 13.27 -9.94 -43.56 641.96 12.60 -2.94 82.5 
  Transport & communications -6.70 23.57 -17.53 10.69 82.32 11.13 16.14 -15.19 13.1 
  Other -22.05 -11.77 58.63 55.08 3.83 37.77 -28.83 37.04 16.2 
Public debt interest -64.78 27.18 18.16 -35.46 12.09 44.61 -10.28 2.18 -0.8 
Total 7.63 28.43 4.89 5.01 22.14 30.88 11.81 0.00 13.8 
  Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Ministry of Finance 
 
3.2.2 Recurrent expenditures 
Recurrent component of the public expenditure is distributed between wage – and non-
wage payments, after taking out non-discretionary expenditures on interest payments on 
public debt and other statutory expenditures. As Table 5 shows, public administration rep-
resents the largest share of government recurrent expenditure, with wage bill being the 
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largest single expenditure item over the last eight years or so. Estimated at 52 percent of 
the recurrent expenditure (18 percent of GDP) in FY2010/11 (Table 6), public wage bill 
is way beyond the conventional benchmark of 35 percent, and tend to deprive investment 
in the real sector—much needed to stimulate economic growth.  
 
 Table 5. Functional composition of central government recurrent expenditure 
  2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 
 
(in million emalangeni) 
     
General public service 1,773.3 2,017.3 2,156.2 2,544.5 2,570.3 3,398.1 4,120.5 3,606.8 
  General administration  1,192.2 1,254.5 1,503.7 1,802.3 1,824.5 2,431.0 2,561.5 2,126.2 
  Public order, safety & defence  581.1 762.8 652.6 742.2 745.9 967.1 1,559.0 1,480.6 
Social services 1,071.6 1,540.8 1,568.6 1,572.9 2,147.9 2,580.3 2,810.2 3,418.0 
  Education  718.4 1,083.6 1,146.7 1,143.5 1,500.3 1,720.5 1,619.3 1,867.8 
  Health 311.3 348.1 311.3 318.4 530.8 705.4 785.5 1,030.9 
  Other community & social ser-
vices 41.9 109.0 110.5 111.0 116.8 154.4 405.4 519.3 
Economic services 443.9 522.9 437.7 400.2 620.4 1,064.4 1,296.3 1,197.0 
  Agriculture  171.0 184.1 160.1 142.8 275.1 333.7 265.6 263.4 
  Industry & mining  62.4 69.9 62.4 54.4 20.2 246.3 243.9 171.6 
  Transport & communications 168.2 226.7 168.0 156.3 234.2 321.7 573.3 465.2 
  Other 42.2 42.2 47.1 46.7 91.0 162.7 213.5 296.8 
Public debt interest 168.9 214.8 253.8 163.8 183.6 265.5 238.2 243.4 
Total 3,457.7 4,295.8 4,416.3 4,681.3 5,522.2 7,308.2 8,465.1 8,465.1 
 
Table 6. Swaziland’s central government recurrent expenditure 
 
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 
2003–2011 
average 
 
(as share of total recurrent expenditure) 
   
 
General public service 51.29 46.96 48.82 54.35 46.54 46.50 48.68 42.61 48.22 
  General administration  34.48 29.20 34.05 38.50 33.04 33.26 30.26 25.12 32.24 
  Public order, safety &  
  defence  16.81 17.76 14.78 15.85 13.51 13.23 18.42 17.49 15.98 
Social services 30.99 35.87 35.52 33.60 38.90 35.31 33.20 40.38 35.47 
  Education  20.78 25.22 25.97 24.43 27.17 23.54 19.13 22.06 23.54 
  Health 9.00 8.10 7.05 6.80 9.61 9.65 9.28 12.18 8.96 
  Other community & 
   social services 1.21 2.54 2.50 2.37 2.12 2.11 4.79 6.13 2.97 
Economic services 12.84 12.17 9.91 8.55 11.23 14.56 15.31 14.14 12.34 
  Agriculture  4.95 4.29 3.63 3.05 4.98 4.57 3.14 3.11 3.96 
  Industry & mining  1.80 1.63 1.41 1.16 0.37 3.37 2.88 2.03 1.83 
  Transport & communi 
   cations 4.86 5.28 3.80 3.34 4.24 4.40 6.77 5.50 4.77 
  Other 1.22 0.98 1.07 1.00 1.65 2.23 2.52 3.51 1.77 
Public debt interest 4.88 5.00 5.75 3.50 3.32 3.63 2.81 2.88 3.97 
Wages and salaries 48.6 45.7 55.3 55.3 52.7 53.7 52.2 52.2 52.0 
         
 
 
(as share of GDP) 
   
 
Recurrent expenditure 24.3 27.4 25.7 25.1 24.8 30.7 34.1 30.3 27.8 
  Wages and salaries 11.8 12.5 14.2 13.9 13.1 16.5 17.3 18.5 14.7 
  Goods and services  7.1 9.1 5.8 6.4 6.4 6.7 9.2 6.4 7.1 
  Subsides and transfers 4.2 4.7 4.6 3.9 4.3 6.5 6.8 4.7 5.0 
Interest 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance and IMF staff estimates 
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Prior to 2008/09 (since early-1990s), the wage bill was kept within the range of 11–13 
percent of GDP. The sudden rise to 17 percent in 2009/10 was driven by salary increases 
of July 2009 (averaging 12%)—across-the-board. In April 2010, government awarded 
civil servants and politicians additional wage increase of 4.5 percent (even though it was 
not budgeted for)—driving public wage bill to 18.5 percent of GDP. As IMF corrected 
noted, these wage increases cast some doubt on the government’s commitment to contain-
ing costs, given a request by the Minister of Finance for an additional supplementary 
budget of SZL 48 million, above the SZL 247 million supplementary budget, tabled earli-
er to finance the wage increases.   
The NPV of the change in personnel spending, 2008–11, is over 150 percent of GDP, 
the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most Sub-Saharan countries have this figure contained 
within the range of 30 to 80 percent of GDP (although still high by international stand-
ard). 
Government priorities as reaffirmed in the 2010/2011 budget are to increase resources 
to education and health sector (in line with the international declarations as these sectors 
have an impact on the overall economic growth and development of the country), create 
more jobs, improve the quality and efficiency of public spending and effectively tackle 
corruption.  
3.2.3 Capital expenditures 
 
Capital expenditure increased from E0.3 billion in 1995/96 (6 percent of GDP) to over 
E2.4 billion (9 percent of GDP) in 2010/11. In 2009/10, capital expenditure accounted for 
accounted for 27 percent of total government spending (and recurrent expenditure 69 per-
cent. Statutory expenditure accounted for the remaining 4 percent). 
Table 7 indicates that much of capital investment is in infrastructure projects (classi-
fied under transport and communication), accounting for over 25 percent of total capital 
expenditure. Government plans to invest SZL 410.4 million in completing an internation-
al airport by 2010/11. Plans are also underway to complete the link road between 
Mbadlane and Sikhuphe and upgrade the Manzini-Mbadlane road. Another E110 million 
has been earmarked for investment in the country’s road network as part of a Medium 
Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS). Other major public works programmes include 
completion of the Mbabane by-pass road, rehabilitation of the Swaziland Broadcasting 
and Information (SBIS) building, the Hlathikulu Hospital, and construction of water 
treatment plants for Siteki-Lomahasha and Nhlangano.  
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Table 7. Swaziland’s central government capital expenditure 
 
 
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 
 
(E’Million) 
      
General public service 276.5 454.5 518.4 419.5 629.1 627.9 694.4 792.4 
  General administration  227.1 373.2 414.7 335.8 505.8 469.5 488.3 607.2 
  Public order, safety & defence  49.4 81.3 103.6 83.7 123.2 158.2 206.1 185.2 
Social services 159.3 317.5 351.8 295.6 245.7 288.7 356.0 561.6 
  Education  32.6 35.6 27.4 32.9 55.9 115.9 113.5 182.3 
  Health 55.7 93.8 111.5 95.4 65.7 106.7 136.6 251.8 
  Other community /social services 71.0 188.1 212.9 167.3 124.1 66.2 106.0 127.5 
Economic services 431.3 486.7 539.6 721.5 1,075.7 1,555.5 1,419.9 1,116.3 
  Agriculture  50.4 60.2 87.8 122.2 148.3 515.7 559.5 272.6 
  Industry & mining  5.2 10.0 28.1 27.1 25.8 95.0 140.4 201.4 
  Transport & communications 308.2 362.0 317.5 381.1 745.6 767.2 691.3 607.3 
  Other 67.4 54.5 106.3 191.2 156.0 177.6 28.7 35.1 
Total 867.1 1,258.7 1,409.7 1,436.6 1,950.4 2,472.1 2,470.3 2,470.3 
 
As percent of capital expenditure 
    
General public service 31.9 36.1 36.8 29.2 32.3 25.4 28.1 32.1 
  General administration  26.2 29.6 29.4 23.4 25.9 19.0 19.8 24.6 
  Public order, safety & defence  5.7 6.5 7.3 5.8 6.3 6.4 8.3 7.5 
Social services 18.4 25.2 25.0 20.6 12.6 11.7 14.4 22.7 
  Education  3.8 2.8 1.9 2.3 2.9 4.7 4.6 7.4 
  Health 6.4 7.5 7.9 6.6 3.4 4.3 5.5 10.2 
  Other community/social services 8.2 14.9 15.1 11.6 6.4 2.7 4.3 5.2 
Economic services 49.7 38.7 38.3 50.2 55.2 62.9 57.5 45.2 
  Agriculture  5.8 4.8 6.2 8.5 7.6 20.9 22.6 11.0 
  Industry & mining  0.6 0.8 2.0 1.9 1.3 3.8 5.7 8.2 
  Transport & communications 35.5 28.8 22.5 26.5 38.2 31.0 28.0 24.6 
  Other 7.8 4.3 7.5 13.3 8.0 7.2 1.2 1.4 
 
In GDP (PERCENT)  
     Capital expenditure 
     
10.4 10.4 8.8 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
Note: 2009/10 estimated outturn, 2010/11Budget 
 
Another ongoing project is the construction of the Sicunusa-Nhlangano Road and the 
Lubombo Regional Hospital, which began in 2010. The challenge, however, is that mon-
ey allocated to capital projects is often under-utilised. The second challenge is how to 
maintain control on recurrent spending to enable government to increase spending on cap-
ital projects. Another challenge is how to deal with corruption. Some individuals con-
nive with government officials to inflate contracts or even making government pay for 
services that were never provided in the first place. Corruption is prevalent in supply 
of goods and services as well as construction projects. It is estimated that government 
loses more than E40 million per month due to corruption. 
 
 
SWAZILAND’S FISCAL POLICY: THE CHOICES A HEAD 
 
22 
 
22 
 
  
3.2.4 External financing instruments and donor participation 
Swaziland is projected to continue to rely on donor support in order to finance its project-
ed current account deficit. In 2011/12 net donor support amounts to 9.4 percent of GDP, 
with grants constituting approximately 8.4 percent of GDP. Project grants included in 
the budget are estimated to increase from E207 million in 2011/12 to E376 million in 
2012/13. The development partners include China (the Taiwanese Government) and 
the EU who have increased their assistance for the implementation of a number of 
projects. The EU funding is supporting interventions in sectors such as agriculture, 
water, governance, health, and education, while the Taiwanese Government is sup-
porting infrastructure projects. The UN is providing funds for health, gender pro-
grammes, statistics and poverty reduction initiatives, while PEPFAR and Global Fund 
remain the Swazi vital partners in the fight against HIV/AIDS.   
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4 Swaziland’s sovereign debt 
 
 
 
This chapter provides insights into Swaziland’s public debt, viz: trends in stock of debt 
over the years, legislative framework (instruments), as well as how these loans are 
planned, sanctioned, executed, and documented. To think that a nominal size of a coun-
try’s stock of debt does not matter as long as it is kept within a range proportional to the 
country’s GDP is being over simplistic. 
  
4.1 Stock of public debt 
In the past, Swaziland followed an expansionary fiscal policy which resulted in a sizable 
buildup of public debt, but this is being reversed with downward trend in debt to GDP 
ratios (Figure 7). Figure 7 shows how the stock of public debt has evolved over the re-
cent decade by 7.4 percentage point of GDP between 2002/03 and 2011/12. 
Figure 7. Swaziland’s public debt as percent of GDP  
 
Source: IMF and Ministry of Finance 
 
Despite recent increased aid flows from E126.9 million in 2003/04 to E499.4 million in 
2010/11, the proportion of the government budget financed by external aid stood at 5 
percent of GDP in 2010/11. Figure 8 shows the trends in stock of public debt, distin-
guished between external and domestic debt over the last ten years.  While the trend re-
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veals downward trajectory for external debt, it has happened at the expense of increased 
domesic borrowing especially from 2009/10 (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Composition of public debt 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Stock of external debt  
Total external debt stock including private sector nonguaranteed debt stood at E3.164 
billion (20 percent of GDP) at the end of March 2010, down from E3.995 billion as at 
the end of March 2009 (denoting a decrease of 20.8 percent), and E4.1 billion (26.1 per-
cent of GDP) as at 31st December 2004, and E4.4 billion as at 31st December 2003. The 
appreciation of the emalangeni against major currencies in which most of the external 
debt was denominated helped to reduce the stock of government debt by 20.8 percent in 
2010. There has been an effort by government to negotiate with international financial 
institutions to provide Rand denominated loans as a way to minimise exposure to for-
eign exchange risk.  
The external debt, which constitutes the largest share of public debt, amounted to 
E2.694 billion at the end of March 2010, down from E3.443 billion at the end of March 
2009. Public external debt (including guarantees to parastatals) decreased from E3.605 
billion to E2.812 billion in 2009. Private sector non-guaranteed debt stood at E351 mil-
lion in 2010 from E392 million in 2009.  Total external debt (including private sector 
non-guaranteed debt) decreased from E3.98 billion in September 2008 to E3.39 billion 
in September 2009, as two loans from the German government to construct the Mnjoli 
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dam and Mpaka-Siteki Road matured. The appreciation of the lilangeni against the US 
dollar also helped improve Swaziland’s external liabilities. However, the fall in external 
debt has not changed the overall debt picture as government resorted to domestic bor-
rowing, with share of domestic debt as percent of total debt increasing from 9.7 percent 
(E0.3877 billion) in 2008/09 to 43 percent (E1.9213 billion) in  2011/12 (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. External and domestic debt as percent of total debt 
 
  
  
 
Source: IMF and Ministry of Finance 
 
Most of the outstanding external debt by March 2011 was owed to multilateral creditor 
organizations, with the AfDB Group being the major creditor accounting for 36.4 per-
cent of total debt stock. Other major multilateral creditors included EIB, IBRD and 
IFAD. Major bilateral creditors were the Governments of Germany, Japan, Kuwait, 
RSA and Republic of China (Taiwan), and the private creditors, which formed the mi-
nority of lenders, are DBSA, Gensec, Hambros and RMB. Table 9 shows the institu-
tional composition of external debt.  
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Table 8 Swaziland’s public debt indicators 
  2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
 
 (E’ Million) 
    
  
Total debt  
    
3,992.6 3,203.4 4,250.7 4,480.2 
External Debt  2,581.9 2,747.8 3,202.8 3,969.3 3,604.9 2,812.5 2,552.9 2,558.9 
Domestic debt   
    
387.7 391.0 1,697.8 1,921.3 
 
 As percent of total debt 
   
  
External Debt  
    
90.3 87.8 60.1 57.1 
Domestic debt  
    
9.7 12.2 39.9 42.9 
 
 As percent of GDP 
   
  
Total debt 20.1 17.9 15.9 17.4 18.8 16.0 12.1 15.0 14.8 
External Debt 17.6 14.6 13.4 14.7 16.7 14.5 10.6 9.0 8.5 
Domestic debt 2.6 3.2 2.5 2.7 2.1 1.5 1.5 6.0 6.3 
Debt Service:   
      
  
(1)  as percent of GDP  1.1 2.2 1.5 1.4 3.3 2.3 1.9 1.5 
(2)  as % of export of  
      goods & services  1.4 3.2 2.4 2.2 5.0 3.5 3.0 2.4 
Exchange rates:   
      
  
SZL/USD   
  
7.2645 8.1438 9.6400 7.3500 6.7838 7.6925 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Swaziland 
 
In 2009/10, the Swaziland Government signed for three new loans totalling 
E358.9 million with Kuwait, the OPEC Fund and the Arab Bank for Economic Devel-
opment in Africa (BADEA) for the construction of the Nhlangano-Sicunusa and 
Mbadlane-Sikhuphe roads, which increased the government’s debt stock that by in June 
2009 stood at 15.7 percent of GDP.   
 
Table 9 Institutional composition of external debt stock (E’ Million) 
 
2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
International Organizations 1,241.7 1,387.8 1,676.7 2,059.1 2,184.9 1,663.0 1,461.9 1,419.3 
 Foreign Governments 703.7 560.3 649.8 996.6 1,035.2 811.9 806.8 875.2 
 Private Lenders 236.3 353.6 415.7 444.5 384.8 337.6 284.2 264.4 
Total Public External Debt 2,181.7 2,301.7 2,742.3 3,500.1 3,604.9 2,812.5 2,552.9 2,558.9 
    o/w: Central Government 1,815.5 1,998.8 2,533.3 3,265.2 3,443.2 2,693.7 2,440.2 2,458.2 
     Statutory Bodies 366.2 302.9 208.9 234.9 161.7 118.7 112.7 100.7 
Private non-guaranteed debt 400.2 446.1 460.5 469.2 390.1 351.3   
 
 
4.1.2 Domestic debt  
From April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010 upto 52 auctions of treasury bills amounting to 
E1.560 billion were put on offer—soliciting upto E2.774 billion in applications against 
a total of E1.4253 billion issued. Of these (total bills issued), E1.2271 billion went to 
local commercial banks, E83.1 million to other financial institutions and E115.1 million 
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to individuals and private organizations. Total amount that was outstanding as at 31 
March 2010 was E341 million. 
Table 10. Public domestic debt, E’million 
 
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
Government stocks and bills 455.61 507.34 426.87 509.38 439.99 387.71 390.98 
  Central Bank of Swaziland 60.00 50.00 80.00 59.19 0.08 8.02 0.00 
  Banks 331.71 387.36 288.78 406.02 413.83 347.36 335.02 
  Other 63.90 69.98 58.09 44.17 26.08 32.33 55.96 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Swaziland 
 
Table 11 Swaziland’s public domestic debt 
 
2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
 
(E’ Million) 
    
  
Total public domestic debt: 
    
387.7 391.0 1,697.8 1,921.3 
  Government stocks & bills 507.34 426.87 509.38 439.99 387.71 390.98   
  Central Bank of Swaziland 50.00 80.00 59.19 0.08 8.0 0.0 59.2 59.3 
  Banks 387.36 288.78 406.02 413.83 347.4 355.0 1,109.5 1,239.6 
  Other  69.98 58.09 44.17 26.08 8.0 56.0 529.0 622.4 
Public domestic debt: 
      
  
  As percent of total debt 
    
9.7 12.2 39.9 42.9 
  As percent of GDP  3.2 2.5 2.7 2.1 1.5 1.5 6.0 6.3 
 
 
4.2 External debt service and practices 
During the financial year 2009/10, total public external debt service amounted to E407.2 
million, which is 19.1 percent below the 2008/09 figure. The decrease in debt service 
was driven by the appreciation of the local currency against the US dollar and other ma-
jor currencies in which most of the external debt is denominated. The debt service con-
stituted principal repayments amounting to E237.5 million whilst E169.7 million was 
directed to interest payments plus commitment fees on undisbursed funds. 
 
4.2.1 External debt sustainability indicators 
Swaziland’s debt burden indicators remain below their policy-dependent thresholds 
according to IMF projections.6 The NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 18.9 percent in 
                                                   
6 Swazi policies and institutions rank as a “strong performer” according to the latest World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Its policy-dependent debt burden thresholds are 
NPV of debt to GDP ratio of 50 percent, NPV of debt-to-exports ratio of 200 percent, NPV of debt to 
revenue ratio of 300 percent, debt service to exports ratio of 25 percent and debt service to revenue 
ratio of 35 percent.  
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2010, lying well below its policy-dependent threshold of 50 percent. It is projected to 
decline continuously thereafter, dropping below 12 percent by 2016.7  Debt-service 
payments are still manageable, reflecting the delivery of HIPC assistance as well as the 
fact that most of Swaziland’s debt has been contracted on concessional terms. Swazi-
land’s debt service-to-exports ratio was 3 percent in 2010/11 and is projected to decline 
to 2 percent by 2015/16. 
However, persistent shocks would worsen Swaziland’s NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 
significantly. If exports were to grow less by one standard deviation in 2011/12, Swazi-
land’s NPV of debt-to-exports ratio would jump up to over 19 percent in 2011/12. An 
export shock would have long lasting negative effects on Swaziland’s debt dynamics, 
keeping the NPV of debt-to-exports ratio above 19 percent until 2016/17. However, 
Swaziland’s NPV of debt-to-exports ratio would remain below its policy-dependent 
threshold when key macroeconomic variables are set at their historical average. 
Imprudent debt management would worsen the country’s NPV of debt-to-exports ra-
tio significantly. If new borrowing were to be contracted on less concessional terms dur-
ing the medium term, Swaziland’s NPV of debt-to-exports ratio would increase substan-
tially.  
With regard to the prevailing debt ratios, the debt stock to exports of goods and ser-
vices decreased to 21.4 percent from 27 percent the previous financial year. The debt 
stock to GDP ratio also fell to 14.2 percent from 17.9 percent recorded the previous fi-
nancial year. The ratio of public debt service to exports of goods and services was esti-
mated at 3.5 percent from 5 percent the previous financial year. All these ratios are still 
within acceptable levels. Although the external debt service ratio as a percentage of ex-
ports and of domestic revenues (about 3.5 percent) remains at levels well below critical 
benchmarks, the government is committed to maintaining public debt within levels that 
it can comfortably manage.  
  
4.2.2 Soverign borrowing and debt management practices 
The increase in public debt in recent years is a clear indication of the need for responsi-
ble soverign borrowing and effective debt management practices to ensure future sus-
tainability of public debt.  How public debt is to be managed is enshrined in the Swazi 
constitution, with the detail in the Public Finance Act. There is also in place, a Public 
                                                   
7 Similarly, the NPV of debt-to-revenue of 187 percent in 2004/05 is well below its policy-dependent 
threshold. 
29 SWAZILAND’S SOVEREIGN DEBT 
 
 
Debt Policy that is supposed to guide in the matters related to acquisition and manage-
ment of public debt.   
We examined the procedural practices associated three new loans that were contract-
ed for specific projects during the financial year 2009/10 regarding their adherence to 
international best practices of internal approval, project due diligence, purpose. One 
loan amounting to USD8 million (equivalent E58.8 million) was contracted from 
BADEA for the construction of Nhlangano-Sicunusa Road. The loan was contracted on 
concessional terms attracting 2.5 percent interest and payable over a period of 22 years. 
The second loan, also contracted for the construction of Nhlangano-Sicunusa Road to-
talled to USD25 million, equivalent to E183.8 million. The loan was sourced from the 
OPEC Fund and is to be repaid over a period of 33 years attracting 3.5 percent interest. 
The last loan, amounting to KWD3.65 million (equivalent to E91.1 million) was con-
tracted from the Government of Kuwait for the construction of Mbadlane-Sikhuphe 
Road. The loan was also contracted on concessional terms at an interest rate of 2.5 per-
cent and payable over 21 years. 
Evidence suggests that all the three loans were contracted with cabinet and legisla-
tive approval. The law of most countries requires legislative approval, sometimes given 
in advance in the form of “debt ceilings”, for government borrowings although such 
ceilings can always be adjusted. In 2010, the Swaziland Government decided to increase 
the weekly borrowing limit from SZL 10 million to SZL 40 million to enable it to gen-
erate up to SZL 520 million during the 2010/11 fiscal year. The government also sought 
to review the legislation governing domestic borrowing that would see it increase the 
annual limit to more than the current SZL 1 billion. That perhaps explains the rapid 
buildup of stock of domestic debt in recent years. And with a weak ‘firewall’ it can only 
be expected that domestic borrowing will continue to grow. 
Project due diligence investigations are undertaken before disbursing funds for a 
specific project especially on the lender’s side, and the post-disbursement monitoring of 
the use of funds, are perceived to be happening. If project due diligence and post-
disbursement monitoring of the use of funds were taken seriously by government, it 
should be able to curb the problem of corruption and ensure efficiency in use of public 
funds.  
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5 Fiscal adjustment strategies 
 
 
There are two ways to deal with the real Swaziland fiscal crisis: ignore it, which would 
be a mistake; or really find ways to limit future increases in wage bills and fiscal defi-
cits. The government wage bill (is estimated at E2.6 billion, approx. 18 percent of GDP 
in FY2010/11), accounts for about 62.95% (51%) of the recurrent budget, which is way 
above the international recommended level of 35 percent, and remains one of the largest 
wage bill in sub-Saharan Africa. Ignoring it would be a sure recipe for deeper crisis. At 
the same time, fiscal adjustment entails risks. Further fiscal contraction in an already 
fragile macroeconomic and growth environment can fuel further instability and perhaps 
new economic downturn. Fiscal adjustment—implies a combination of lower spending 
and higher revenue.  
  
5.1 The baseline scenario 
 
Under baseline scenario, no fiscal adjustment will be needed. The baseline scenario as-
sumes that the fiscal crisis will last longer and that Swaziland will need to continue with 
expansionary fiscal policy as it did in 2009/2010. The same government spending is 
continued for additional five years. The results in Figure 10 show that under the baseline 
scenario, the overall fiscal balance would rise to 15 percent of GDP in 2011. The deficit 
would fall to 14 pecent in 2013/14 and remain at that level over the medium term. The 
the debt to GDP ratio would rise to unsustainable levels over the medium term (Figure 
11). 
 
5.2 Gradual fiscal adjustment  
 
Swaziland is assumed to take a more gradual approach to adjusting its primary balance 
in order to reach the policy target of less than 3 percent of GDP in 2014/15 and in the 
medium term. Specifically, annual fiscal adjustment is limited to 2 percentage point of 
GDP. Under this scenario, the primary deficit—which measures the budget taking out 
interest payments, thus reflecting the underlying fiscal policy stance—is projected to 
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improve from a deficit of about 10 percent in 2009/10 to a deficit of 1.1 percent in 
2015/16, with a small primary surplus of 0.1 percent in 2013/14 (Figure 10).  
  
Figure 10. Overall fiscal balance as percent of GDP, 2009/10 – 2015/16 
 
Note: Under FAR/fiscal adjustment scenario Government would cut public spending, increase gov-
ernment revenue, or both. Much will depend on the pace of recovery of fiscal revenue, which in 
turn will depend, in part, on GDP growth, the pressure that the funding of social programme are 
already putting on government budget, and the political feasibility of cutting key recurrent 
spending items in the budget. 
 
Figure 11. Central Government debt, percent of GDP under different scenarios 
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Under the second scenario in which primary balance is set at the historical level, public 
debt would decline. Public debt would remain sustainable over the medium term. Based 
on the debt sustainability analysis, the debt to GDP ratio would peak at 27 percent in 
2014/15 and start coming down thereafter. Debt service projections show interest pay-
ments gradually doubling to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2014/15.  
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6 Conclusions and implications for policy 
 
 
This paper set out to to examine the stance of fiscal policy in Swaziland since the 1980s, 
including the attempts that have been made to restrain fiscal deficits and sovereign debt 
that have built up over the past 15 years, and possible options (sustainable solutions) to 
the fiscal question, taking into account the speed of fiscal adjustment (i.e. how fast gov-
ernment should aim to make fiscal adjustment in Swaziland). Results suggest that the 
fiscal policy management in Swaziland is not sufficiently robust. Evidence points to two 
major drivers of fiscal deficit in Swaziland: the collapse of the fiscal discipline and and 
external dependency (over reliance on SACU revenue and primary commodity exports).  
Evidence further shows that if the fiscal adjustment road map is successfully imple-
mented, the economy should be able to generate a surplus within three years (of FAR) 
and government debt should remain sustainable over the medium term. However, policy 
inaction would be a sure recipe for deeper crisis as the overall fiscal balance would stay 
above 14.5 percent over the medium term and debt to GDP ratio would rise to unsus-
tainable levels over the medium term.  
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